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Management Behavior—An Auditing Horizon 
W. Donald Georgen 
Touche Ross & Co . 
The independent accountant has—and always had—a responsibility to look 
for management fraud and illegal acts. Less clear is the auditor's responsibility to 
discover these activities if they have occurred. The professional literature is 
ambiguous, and the recent Supreme Court ruling in the Hochfelder case did little 
to resolve the uncertainty. Speaking practically, however, the profession must face 
up to the expectations of the public. The question is not whether we have any 
responsibility i n these areas—the real questions today are, how far does that 
responsibility go, and how should the independent accountant go about executing 
that charge. 
Whi le not new, this responsibility is being given considerable attention by 
practitioners, academicians, and regulatory agencies, as well as the courts, because 
of the sensational disclosures recently regarding implied improprieties (most of 
which have not been proved conclusively), management fraud, and illegal pay-
ments. The public is concerned and dismayed, not only that such events could 
have happened, but also that they were not detected and reported on a timely 
basis. Ultimately, that concern focuses on the independent accountant. In the 
public view, the independent accountant has the best opportunity (and therefore 
the responsibility) to determine that proper controls are operative to prevent such 
events, or where those controls fail, to timely detect and report the events. The 
public must acknowledge that independent accountants w i l l never be able to 
guarantee that all instances of management fraud and other illegal acts have been 
detected—but on the other hand, it is my opinion that our detection "hit rate" 
must be substantially improved. 
Attributes of Management Fraud and Other Illegal Acts 
Before we attempt any analysis of the auditor's responsibility, we have to 
examine the attributes of management fraud (and analogously, illegal acts). Also, 
we must look at the traditional audit approach to see how it might be changed. 
Fraud, very simply, is a deceptive practice—one where the perpetrator hopes 
to avoid detection. (Armed robbery is not a fraud, because the overt act is 
obvious.) Frauds in the business environment fall into two broad categories— 
those occurring at the employee level and those occurring at the management 
level. 
Employee frauds generally have two basic characteristics: 
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—The object of the fraud is to convert cash or merchandise to the indi-
vidual's benefit. 
—The activities of the employees are or should be covered by an effective 
system of internal control. Although an effective system w i l l not prevent 
all acts of employee fraud, it should provide for early detection and 
preclude frequent repetition. 
The characteristics of management fraud are significantly different: 
—Generally, fraud at the management level does not involve direct theft of 
cash or merchandise; instead, it often involves "performance" fraud—the 
deceptive practices result in high reported earnings or they forestall the 
recognition of a decline. 
—Indirect benefits accrue to management from the fraud—salary, bonus, 
profit sharing, and/or value of stock options may be improved or pre-
served, and the likelihood of continued employment is increased. 
—The fraud is likely to operate outside of established business systems and 
related internal controls—in other words, the bosses are not subject to 
the system. 
—The nature of the deceptive act is not always apparent, for it may be 
difficult to determine whether deception or error in judgment is involved. 
I would particularly like to emphasize the last two points. Management most 
often has the ability to operate outside the system, simply because it is generally 
the top point of control in the system. A n d the independent accountant is often 
unable to distinguish deception from an "honest mistake"—at least unti l subse-
quent discernments provide a clue to management's motives. These two points 
underscore our dilemma. The traditional auditing approach is not really effective 
against management fraud. Also, the traditional audit approach, which is inde-
pendent and neutral, does not focus on the judgments necessary to evaluate the 
qualitative aspects of management activity. 
The Audit Approach 
Given the characteristics of management fraud, let us take a critical look at 
the usual audit approach. Traditionally, generally accepted auditing standards 
have allowed the independent accountant to assume that management's behavior 
w i l l conform to a predictable, set pattern. In other words, although he should be 
alert to fraud opportunities, the auditor's primary objective is the gathering of 
sufficient evidential material to form a series of judgments leading to the expres-
sion of a professional opinion on the financial statements—not the detection of 
fraud. The auditor's conventions tell h im to gather "enough" of the "right k i n d " 
of audit evidence. Although there are conventions which give guidance to the 
determination of "enough" and "right k i n d , " the auditor's judgment in the 
particular situation is the principal determinant of audit scope. 
Does this suggest that the auditor's scope or approach has to be changed to 
improve the fraud detection rate? The answer is probably yes. Does it suggest 
that all audits should be performed in the fraud mode—where you turn over 
every stone and peel every grape? The answer is categorically N O ! The cost to 
society would be prohibitive, given the relative number of actual frauds perpe-
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trated. A n d more importantly, given a dishonest management, the independent 
accountant would never be able to do enough work to satisfy himself—or anyone 
else—that all acts of fraud were detected. W e simply cannot assume the total 
responsibility for fraud detection, if we are to be honest with ourselves and 
society. However, i n the same breath I have to admit that we have to be con-
cerned with the consequences of the relatively few frauds. A n d even though we 
can't catch them all, I am convinced that we can catch substantially more than 
we have in the past. 
Coping with Fraud 
In my judgment, it's a matter of working "smarter" rather than "harder." W e 
say that the auditor's responsibility in the attest environment is to make an 
"informed judgment"—and I think the way to improve detection of fraud lies 
in that phrase. Further, I don't believe exponentially exploding the number of 
transactions tested and accountabilities verified necessarily results in a more 
"informed judgment." Although the scope of the evidence gathering is always 
important, the quality of the information gathered, how it is obtained, how it is 
correlated, and the overall evaluation process are equally important in arriving 
at an "informed judgment." 
Our f irm has spent considerable time and effort in developing an approach 
which we believe w i l l make us more effective in the detection of management 
fraud. The procedures are not new, but the emphasis is. The program has 
basically three features; and they are all related: 
—an effective client investigation program before we commence a new 
engagement and a similar periodic update on continuing engagements; 
—an in-depth understanding of the client's business—the economic condi-
tions, the inherent control problems, the peculiarities of the industry; and 
—concentration on material transactions—to determine their true nature 
and their arm's-lengthness, and to determine the proper accounting and 
the required disclosures. 
Client Investigation 
The client investigation feature of this approach puts emphasis on determining 
the reputation of the company and, in particular, its management. The questions 
asked and the information gathered are intended to answer the question—is this 
a company and are these people with whom we want to professionally associate? 
Is there any reason we should not associate? 
Some w i l l argue that this "exclusiveness" is socially irresponsible. Some w i l l 
argue that all public companies are entitled to the services of an independent 
accountant. However, society has decreed that an independent accountant's 
investigative tools are to be limited—there is no subpoena power and no right to 
take testimony under oath. Instead, society has inculcated that there be a pro-
fessional relationship between independent accountant and client. W i t h i n that 
structure, I believe the independent accountant is entitled to accept professional 
associations with care—indeed, I believe care is essential. 
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Understanding the Client's Business 
Understanding the business is part of the client investigation routine which 
carries over into the establishment of scope or depth of the audit. Here we 
concentrate on: 
—who is management, or who can make the business decision (Appendix 
A ) ; 
— i n what roles does the management group operate (Appendix B ) ; 
—what economic factors are present in this industry—in this company— 
which would be conducive to encouraging or enhancing the fraud oppor-
tunity (Appendix C ) ; 
—what is the business structure, and would it facilitate or prevent the 
management fraud act (Appendix D ) . 
When we have gathered, correlated and evaluated this information we then 
identify the areas of risk and set the scope of our audit procedures relative to the 
degree of risk. The evaluation is a professional judgment—but a professional 
judgment based on the relevant facts. Occasionally, based on our evaluation, we 
w i l l say that the business factors individually or collectively present a risk situation 
which we cannot audit. In these circumstances we should—and have—with-
drawn from the engagement. 
Material Transactions 
The third feature of our approach is a concentration on material transactions. 
Again, this part of our approach carries over from the client investigation and 
our efforts to understand the client's business. We do not pick a random selec-
tion of transactions and accountabilities and look for management fraud. Rather, 
we first identify all material transactions and accountabilities and then analyze 
those transactions i n depth, for management involvement and its consequences. 
In the absence of direction from the profession, the regulatory agencies, or the 
courts we have established the following standards of "materiality" for this 
process: 
—balance sheet items—measured at 5 percent of total assets 
—shareholders' equity items—5 percent of total shareholders' equity 
—income statement: 
—sales or purchase items—10 percent of total sales or purchases 
—operating income or expense items—5 percent of income before extra-
ordinary or unusual items 
—nonoperating items—5 percent of pre-tax income 
When we have identified a material transaction i n which management or a 
related party is involved, we audit to evaluate the transaction and the nature of 
the management involvement. W e study the transaction so that we can ask for 
and obtain the relevant documentation—we want documentation, not conversa-
tion. We then go one step further and request independent confirmation of the 
details behind the transaction. This is an important distinction from the tradi-
tional approach. W e go beyond the normal confirmation of transaction timing, 
amounts involved, balances due or owing, and terms. W e specifically ask for 
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confirmation of all of the facts—previous, continuing, and prospective—which 
are conditions of the transaction. This procedure is intended to determine if there 
might be additional documentation or even unwritten understandings which over-
ride the available records. 
A Professional Overview 
Our approach, although now in effect for 18 months, as a "state of the art" is 
still in the development stage. Other firms are experimenting with their programs 
under the general guidance of S A S 6 of the A I C P A on "Related Party Trans-
actions." The usefulness of this approach to fraud detection w i l l evolve as we 
all gain more experience. I seriously doubt if any "brand new" audit procedures 
w i l l come out of these efforts, but the auditor's attention w i l l be directed more 
explicitly. A management fraud approach must put emphasis on informed judg-
ment, insist on substantive rather than mechanical analysis, encourage probing of 
material transactions for a better understanding of the facts, and in general 
promote a "healthy skepticism." 
In the late '60s and the early '70s a number of famous management frauds 
surfaced. More recently, another, more wide-spread form of illegal activity has 
come to the fore. The press has been full of stories of illegal political payments, 
slush funds and apparent bribes. Again, the public is asking, where was the 
independent accountant? 
Illegal Payments 
As I indicated earlier, it is my judgment that this illegal payment problem is 
analogous to the larger management fraud problem, insofar as it challenges the 
role of the independent accountant. This is true because illegal acts are often 
the product of management's direct involvement or indirect forebearance because 
of industry practices, economic conditions, or systems and control weaknesses. 
But let's put these problems in their proper perspective. The public arousal 
over illegal payments and the cries for disclosure and "cease and desist" are in my 
judgment a product of the Watergate environment. Illegal payments are not a 
new phenomenon on the business scene, as evidenced by present disclosures. Many 
of the news stories report questionable payments, covering an extended prior 
period. W h y was there not earlier concern over these practices—by the public, 
the regulatory agencies and independent accountants? Whi le many w i l l profess 
ignorance—and I suspect most people were not aware of the widespread nature 
of the practice and the huge sums involved—I believe that, as a result of the 
concept that these payments are "accepted business practice," the problem was 
generally ignored. 
Without going into the developing morality or flailing ourselves for past 
omissions, I am wi l l ing to say that I believe it is our responsibility, as independent 
accountants, to be satisfied that our clients' audited financial statements taken as 
a whole contain adequate disclosure, and provisions for the financial effects (where 
applicable) of illegal payments. In the absence of direction or standards from the 
profession and the regulatory agencies, however, the specific ground rules for 
accomplishing this responsibility are very unclear. 
Rather than philosophize as to the ultimate direction the profession w i l l 
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take, I would like to share with you the policies and practices that we have 
adopted, in our firm, to deal with the subject of illegal payments. 
W e have decided that we cannot define illegal payments per se. W e say this 
determination is ultimately a judicial question and an opinion—as to legality or 
illegality—can only be given by competent legal counsel. W e then treat the subject 
based on defined illegal payments and "possibly" illegal payments. As in our 
approach to management fraud, we have identified possible situations where 
illegal payments may be expected. The purpose of this initial analysis is to direct 
the audit emphasis. For example, the independent accountant should be alert for 
the possibility of illegal payments when the client sells i n countries where those 
business practices are expected, or where there are substantial cash transactions, or 
where there are significant "soft expenses." W e have also developed standards of 
materiality i n determining the scope of our examination for such payments. 
Where we have knowledge that an illegal or possibly illegal payment has 
occurred, we require: 
—that the matter be discussed with the client's board of directors; 
—that an opinion be requested from the client's legal counsel as to the 
legality/illegality of the payment, the requirements for disclosure under 
the securities acts, and the form and content of that disclosure; 
—consultation with our national technical staff; and 
—finally, an objective evaluation of all the information and the legal opin-
ions to determine the propriety of financial presentation and disclosure, 
and the impact, if any, on our auditor's report. 
Although we are once again in a "state of the art" situation without specific 
direction from the profession, regulatory agencies or the courts, we believe our 
program is focused on the essentials of the problem—detection and disclosure. 
Some Concluding Observations 
In talking with you about management fraud and illegal payments, I have 
tried to avoid any suggestion that we were talking about specific procedures or 
standard steps. A n d I particularly want to emphasize that we are talking about an 
integrated whole. O r said a different way, we think this approach is simply a 
re-emphasis of the business approach to auditing—defining the "business ap-
proach" in the broadest possible terms. 
As a result of thinking through the approach to management fraud and illegal 
payments, we have given more thought to our overall audit objective. It is 
apparent that a successful audit depends on more than program details. It is 
apparent that a proper attitude or philosophical audit approach is necessary. For 
the last several years, we have summarized these "truths" in a year-end audit 
reminder to our professionals, and I would like to share them with you: 
• Our assignment is to independently challenge and evaluate, not to ra-
tionalize. 
• When we say we want to emphasize the "business approach" to auditing, 
we mean do the reported facts make business sense—not can we support 
what management has concluded. 
• O n each engagement, we have to ask the question—-are the statements 
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auditable? We have to make a rational judgment; the conclusion is not 
a given assumption. 
• Emphasis has to be placed on a basic evaluation of evidentiary material— 
not a mechanical analysis of reported transactions and accountabilities. 
• Aud i t evidence must be based on factual documentation, not conversation. 
• Accounting and reporting matters are governed by generally accepted 
accounting principles. In many areas G A A P parameters are fairly broad. 
In the application of accounting principles we have the responsibility to 
determine the appropriateness of the principles i n the circumstances. 
• The responsibility to perform an effective audit of the facts is just as 
important as the proper resolution of accounting and reporting issues. 
W e have to guard against a preoccupation with the solution of account-
ing and reporting issues to the exclusion of the audit of the underlying 
facts. 
• W e need the appropriate level of audit management involved on all 
audits. A significant part of the audit process is evaluative and judg-
mental. The skills necessary to execute these qualitative factors are 
developed largely through experience. W e cannot delegate experience. 
We cannot delegate these judgments in the critical areas of the engage-
ment. 
• The development of audit skills requires a basic methodology; a disci-
plined approach and experience. The methodology can be taught and 
experience is a product of time and variety of engagement assignments. 
Development of a disciplined approach is dependent on the environment 
i n the office i n which the professional works and the perceived attitudes 
and work habits of those for whom he works. The development of a 
proper disciplined approach from the bottom up can happen only if we 
have a properly disciplined approach at the top—in the management 
group. 
In my opinion, the problem of illegal payments w i l l largely disappear i n a 
relatively short time. The public outcry, the pain and embarrassment of public 
disclosure and censure, tighter corporate policies and controls, closer scrutiny by 
boards of directors and others, and specific Federal regulations w i l l effectively 
limit these practices. 
Management fraud, on the other hand, is with us and is not going to go 
away, i n the absense of any moral uplifting. The pressure for earnings growth 
has been a catalyst for management fraud in a stable or accelerating economy; 
the pressure for survival i n uncertain economic times may be an even greater 
stimulant. W e can say that other disciplines—the board of directors, the audit 
committee, the public and the regulatory agencies—have a responsibility to force 
management integrity. But we cannot deny our own responsibility. W e can say 
that we can't catch them all—and this is true—but we have to catch more of 
them. Some w i l l say that making an independent accountant look for fraud is an 
unreasonable burden; I would suggest to you that a properly balanced respon-
sibility offers us an opportunity to attain top professional status. 
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Appendix A 
W h o is management? 
• Officers 
• Directors 
• Associates 
• Affiliates 
• Trustees 
• Partners 
• Co-venturers 
• Principal Stockholders 
• Others 
Appendix B 
Management Involvement Role 
• Buyer • Debtor 
• Seller • Creditor 
• Guarantor • Nominee 
• Lessee • Franchisee 
• Lessor • Franchisor 
• Forebearer • Licensee 
• Licensor 
Not intended to be all-inclusive 
Appendix C 
Some Conducive Economic Factors 
• Insufficient working capital or credit 
• Urgent desire for good earnings to support stock price 
• Developing industry—massive demand for new capital 
• Dependence on a very few products, customers or transactions 
• Debt restrictions binding 
• A declining industry with many business failures 
• Company with excess capacity 
• Many lawsuits, especially from shareholders 
• Rapid expansion or numerous acquisitions, especially i n diversification 
• Collection difficulties from key customers, for instance, R E I T s 
• Inventories requiring non-auditor expertise 
• Long-term manufacturing cycle 
• Unrealistic sales projections 
• Obsolescence danger—high technology industry 
Appendix D 
Examples of Conducive Business Structure 
• Dispersal of locations, documents, evidence 
• Diversified company and accounting systems 
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• Management dominated by one or few 
• Divided audit responsibility 
• Inadequate internal audit function 
• Extreme mobility i n key financial positions 
• Mobility or lack of outside legal counsel 
• Constant crisis mode in accounting function 
• Numerous substantive adjusting entries in audit closing 
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